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No general statement concerning the effects of tax factors on transatlantic invest-
ments is accurate beyond the obvious one that taxation is always relevant. But tax
considerations are seldom dominant, and differences in taxation are frequently neg-
ligible from a pecuniary standpoint, though the prospect of having to meet the
reporting requirements of two or more national tax jurisdictions may deter foreign
investment by small businesses. Investment climates and exchange controls generally
are more important than tax differences in investment decisions
The net effects of taxation on any specific investment depend on the interplay of
the laws of the two countries involved, the source country in which the income is
earned and the destination country to which it goes. An analysis of the influence
of taxation must take account of the distinctive features of each country's tax laws
as they apply to income paid from it to foreign recipients and received in it from
sources abroad. Principal attention in this paper will be given to the U.S. tax laws,
with particular emphasis on the taxation of income received here from abroad. Com-
parisons with the tax laws of other countries will give perspective and will illustrate
the need for precise analysis for specific investments.
The United States taxes its individual citizens and corporations currently on all
income from foreign sources but allows a credit against the U.S. tax for taxes paid
where the income is earned.2 These two provisions, general inclusion of foreign-
source income in the U.S. tax base and general allowance of foreign taxes as a credit
against the U.S. tax, are basic and long-standing in our tax law.
The only exception to these general rules as applied to individual citizens is an
exemption of a limited amount of income earned abroad while resident or traveling
in foreign countries. All investment income and all capital gains are currently
taxable regardless of their sources or the place of residence of the taxpayer. Current
taxability on a global basis is truly an annual price of citizenship.
0 Professor of Finance emeritus, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration; Lccturcr,
Stanford Graduate School of Business; Chairman, Fisons Corporation; former Deputy to the Secretary of
the Treasury in charge of tax policy (during the Eisenhower Administration). Author, FEDERAL TAx
REFoRm (1963), TAx FACTORS its BUSINESS DECISIONS (1969).
a In fact, in both this country and France, some leading industrialists have said that they make inter-
national investment decisions on the basis of before-tax income. They justify this surprising position
on the grounds that tax laws change so rapidly that a calculation of after-tax income would give a false
sense of precision and, more importantly, that, if the investment climate in a country is good enough to
justify investment, it is probable that the tax burden in it, whatever form it takes, will not be far
out of line with that in other countries.
'INT. REV. CoDE Of 1954, §§ 61, 901-04. A tax credit permits a dollar-for-dollar offset against the
U.S. tax; it must be distinguished from a deduction from income in computing taxable income, which
leads to a net saving in tax equal to the deduction times the applicable tax rate.
5 INr. Rav. CODE Of 1954, § 91r.
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A U.S. corporation is also taxed currently on its world-wide income, regardless
of the location of its offices or activities. But if it operates abroad through subsidiaries
incorporated abroad, taxation generally applies only as the income is received from
subsidiaries as dividends, interest, service charges, or in any other form. Consolidated
financial statements, which would permit losses of foreign subsidiaries to be offset
against domestic income of the parent corpoartion here or elsewhere, are not per-
mitted The principal exception to this general rule regarding foreign subsidiaries
applies to the income of foreign corporations which are deemed to be used as
tax havens according to objective statutory standards. The income of these subsidiaries
is imputed to and taxed currently to their U.S. parent corporations.
Our system of taxation of foreign-source income means that a tax rate at least
as high as the U.S. rate ultimately will be applied either here or abroad on foreign
income earned by U.S. citizens and U.S. corporations. If the foreign tax, where the
income is earned, is lower than the U.S. tax, the United States collects the difference;
if the foreign tax is equal to or higher than the U.S. tax, there is no U.S. tax. If the
foreign tax is higher than that which would be imposed in the United States, the
tax burden on income from foreign investment is greater by that amount than the
U.S. tax would be on domestic investment, but it is the foreign government, not the
U.S. government, which is to blame. (And so long as the foreign tax is not dis-
criminatory against U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries, the foreign tax, though
high by U.S. standards, is neutral in its treatment of U.S.-owned and domestic busi-
ness in the foreign country.)
In brief, the underlying objective of the U.S. income tax law is to maintain
neutrality in the taxation of domestic and foreign-source income of U.S. business.
Foreign direct investment by U.S. business is neither penalized nor favored by our
law in terms of total income tax payable, and the prior right of the foreign countries
to tax where income is earned is fully recognized by the allowance of credits for
foreign taxes against the U.S. tax.
In practice this seemingly simple and perhaps sensible objective is frequently not
achieved because of the interplay of the tax laws of the two or more countries in-
volved in a specific business situation. The fault may lie in the inadequacy of the
foreign tax credit, or it may arise because many foreign countries, as well as the
United States, impose taxes on both corporate income as it is earned and on dividends
paid to foreigners, including dividends paid to foreign parent corporations. The
combined burden of the corporate income tax and the withholding tax on dividends
may thus exceed the tax on corporate income, which would be the only tax paid
by a U.S. corporation on domestic business. Also, different national rules on the
allocation of international income between the two or more countries which have a
"France is an exception, consolidated financial statements being permitted in certain limited circum-
stances.
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rightful claim to some part of it may lead to a result where the sum of the parts
is considerably greater than the whole, in ways which are explained later.
In one way or another, income from foreign direct investment is likely to be
subject to a higher income tax burden than that which would be imposed if the
business were conducted entirely in one of the two countries. In addition, other
forms of taxation, little used in the United States, are imposed at high rates in Europe
and are not creditable against the U.S. income tax. Thus the combined total tax
burden may be much higher on international business, with income taxes higher in
the U.S. and other forms of tax higher in Europe. The repeal of the investment
credit, by raising the effective U.S. corporate income tax rate, would increase this
general discrepancy.
Neutrality in taxation is frequently cited as one of the principal criteria of an
acceptable-one always hesitates to say a "good"--tax system. But neutrality, like
equity-another familiar cirterion-has no objective standard against which com-
parisons can be made. A country may impose all of its own taxes on income from
foreign direct investment, subject to credits for foreign taxes, on the theory that this
assures neutrality with domestic business and therefore prevents any tax inducement
to carry on activities abroad. This is, essentially, the U.S. policy.
Alternatively, a country may recognize that foreign subsidiaries and branches
must be able to compete effectively with local business where they operate, and thus
should be subject only to the taxes in that country. From this standpoint, neutrality
would require exemptions from taxation of income from direct foreign investment
in the country of the parent company and full but nondiscriminatory taxation in the
country where the business is conducted. This is the policy in the Netherlands, which
gives virtual exemption by waiving its own tax if the foreign income has been
subject to any income tax, regardless of the rate, in the country where it was earned.
Thus, foreign direct investment by companies in the Netherlands can compete on
equal tax terms with local competitors wherever they choose to operate, without any
overriding tax, current or deferred, in the home country.
Two other standards may be adopted by countries of destination, that is the
countries in which the head office or parent companies are located and from which
some capital presumably has been exported. The country of destination may impose
a low flat rate of tax on income from foreign direct investment, without reference
to what taxes, if any, have been imposed by the source country. This is the policy
adopted by France, and it was seriously considered in the United States during the
middle i95os. It has the advantage of collecting some revenue from business income,
a feature which has political appeal and some justification in equity. But if the tax
in the source country is as high, or almost as high, as the tax in the country of
destination, the combination of two taxes will exceed that which would be applicable
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to domestic business income in either country, thereby discriminating against inter-
national investment.
The fourth and final alternative is full taxation of net income from foreign
sources in the country of destination. This would be the most onerous of all in
imposing heavier burdens on international income. By taxing only net income
from foreign sources, the country of destination recognizes the prior right of the
country of source to tax but treats that tax as simply another element of cost. With
this approach, if each country had a fifty per cent tax, the combined burden would
be seventy-five per cent of before-tax income, with the country of source taking
fifty per cent of before-tax income and the country of destination taking half of the
remainder when paid as a dividend, for the total of seventy-five per cent. The early
work in the League of Nations on model tax conventions in the 1920S was directed
against this simple but restrictive treatment. The system of tax credits developed
in the model conventions eliminated the penalty aspect of dual taxation, leaving a
burden equal to that of whichever country had the higher tax, assuming no differences
arising from definitions or allocations of income.
No major country has failed to take some action to relieve full double taxation of
international business income. The tax credit device is probably the most common
form of relief. This is sometimes granted unilaterally by statute, as in the United
States. In other countries some or all of the credit is granted only in bilateral tax
treaties, with the allowance of credits coupled with other important provisions con-
cerning allocation of income, exchange of information, and reciprocal relief provisions
waiving taxes on limited categories of income, usually that arising during brief visits
by artists, professors, students, or professional specialists. A country which gives a
full credit by statute, as the United States has done, has given away an important
bargaining position in treaty negotiations.
A review of the points of view underlying the different tax policies with respect
to income from foreign direct investment will perhaps help in anticipating the direc-
tions of change. Any country may be presumed to be jealous of its right to tax all
activities carried on in its borders. It may be expected to be especially sensitive
about proposals for special tax treatment of foreign-owned business. Thus, one can
start with a presumption that business income will be taxed in the first instance in
the country where it is earned. No country disputes this right, though there are
different concepts as to the source of income and some reciprocal arrangements have
been developed in treaties to waive this right as a matter of public policy or con-
venience.
The source country may also choose to waive its right to tax on a nonreciprocal
basis to encourage both domestic and foreign investment. Tax holidays or special
investment allowances are familiar features of economic development programs. Their
effectiveness is debatable, as even full tax exemption will not lead to much invest-
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ment in an environment where the prospects for profit are slight or the risks of
capital loss are great. But tax concessions are nonetheless often granted in developing
countries. When offered, they are typically available in principle to both domestic
and foreign investment, though in fact they may be established for particular in-
dustries which are carried on almost exclusively by foreign, or by domestic, business.
When a country grants a tax concession to encourage investment, it is under-
standable that there will be resentment if the revenue which it forgoes is picked
up by the country to which the income ultimately goes. This is particularly true
when the country foregoing revenue is a "poor" developing country and the coun-
try of destination is a "rich" capital-exporting country. This resentment and
apparent paradox have been the basis for the many proposals for destination countries
to recognize by legislation or treaties the tax concession given where income is
earned. It is argued by the countries granting tax concession that the taxes waived
should be allowed as credits, along with taxes paid, against the taxes imposed in
the countries of destination. Tax sparing has in fact been recognized in various
European countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.
Treaties with clauses recognizing tax sparing were negotiated by the United
States in the late i95os but never ratified by the Senate. The Kennedy and Johnson
administrations opposed tax sparing and proposed instead an investment credit for
investment in developing countries in treaty negotiations. This was never received
with particular enthusiasm either in the developing countries or by the Senate. With
the probable repeal of the investment credit for domestic purposes, there would be no
justification for extending it to foreign investment; in fact, it had little justification
even when available for domestic investment because the income from foreign
investment was so frequently not subject to any net U.S. tax.
The objections in the developing countries to a failure of destination countries
to recognize tax sparing are not altogether well-founded because their own tax con-
cessions are fully effective for foreign subsidiaries until profits are withdrawn from
the country. In fact, the existence of a residual U.S. tax on repatriation, which would
be reduced or eliminated if tax sparing were recognized, would tend to discourage
withdrawal of profits and thereby encourage reinvestment in the developing country,
thus reinforcing the basic objective of the tax sparing program. The nullification
by the capital-exporting country of the tax concessions of capital-importing countries
occurs only when profits are withdrawn from subsidiaries. Current taxation of
income of branches does, of course, involve immediate absorption of tax concessions.
The logic regarding recognition of tax sparing has been confused, if not actually
mangled, on both sides. One reason given for opposing tax-sparing provisions in
treaties was that it encouraged developing countries to give differential tax treat-
ment, and this was stated to be bad in principle. But this objection was, to say
the least, incongruous when it was made in an administration which proposed the
investment credit for domestic purposes and later proposed extension of it to
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foreign investment in developing countries. Finally, the general increase in taxes
abroad to a level such that many, if not most, large companies had excess foreign
tax credits meant that U.S. recognition of tax sparing would neither involve sig-
nificant revenue loss to the United States Treasury nor, correspondingly, significantly
increase the net profits of business. At this point, the whole issue would seem to
dissolve into unimportance for both countries. But the emotional content is still
strong. In capital-importing countries there is resentment about a presumed nullifica-
tion of the national decision to forgo taxes. And in the capital-exporting countries
there is resentment at the idea that "a tax not paid counts as much as a tax which is
paid." If this is allowed for income from investment abroad, is there not discrimina-
tion against domestic investment? In the absence of more rationality on both sides,
it would seem useful to make the virtually costless concession to the emotions
prevalent in capital-importing countries, if a tax-sparing clause would help in pro-
ducing a treaty which is useful in other ways.
The foregoing discussion on tax sparing is relevant primarily to investment in
developing countries. Though many countries in Western Europe give tax con-
cession in the form of investment credits or very rapid depreciation allowances, the
issue of recognition of a tax-sparing seldom if ever arises in international negotiations
with or between them. The arguments concerning it serve, however, to indicate the
complexities in analysis and the emotion which develops in international tax affairs.
A more fundamental and pervasive fact is the extent to which the combined
burdens of corporate income taxes and withholding taxes on dividends in industrial
countries have risen to the point where taxes in the source countries are likely to
exceed the taxes due in the countries of destination. In the United States this situa-
tion is made more likely by the permission to lump together, in calculating income
and credits, the income from all foreign countries and the taxes paid in all foreign
countries under the so-called over-all limitation This means that a tax at a forty
per cent effective rate in one country can be combined with a tax at a sixty per cent
effective rate in another country and, with equal amounts of income from each
country, the average tax is fifty per cent. If the U.S. tax rate was fifty per cent and
the countries were treated separately, an incremental tax of ten per cent would be
due on income from the country with the lower rate. But under the over-all limita-
tion the incremental tax is wiped out by the higher tax in the other country. Though
the higher tax by itself would not be allowed as a credit against the tax on domestic
income, it is allowed as a credit against the incremental tax which would be imposed
on other foreign income.
Under a credit sysem it seems reasonable to expect that in the long run the
countries where income is earned will find ways to collect taxes at least up to the
level allowed as a credit in the countries to which the income will be paid. This can
' INT. REV. CODE of i954, § 904(a) (2).
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readily be accomplished, even if the corporation tax rate is reasonably low, by im-
posing taxes at fairly high rates on dividends paid to foreign shareholders but with
a limitation that the combined tax will not exceed the amount creditable in the
destination country. This was, in fact, done in Panama some years ago. It would
appear that only inertia prevents similar action elsewhere.
Maximum taxes on dividends are, to be sure, frequently specified in tax treaties,
usually at fifteen per cent and sometimes at five per cent on dividends to parent
companies. These limitations, however, are more in the nature of conventional
figures than calculated amounts designed to assure the destination country that the
total foreign taxes will leave room for a residual corporate tax on repatriated profits.
Withholding taxes on all dividends are common in Europe as a means of collection.
Insofar as they apply to foreign stockholders, the limitations on them do indeed
serve to leave room for the country of residence of stockholders to apply a net
tax, a result consistent with the general policy that the country of residence should
have a reasonable expectation of securing a substantial part of the tax on global
income of its residents. (The major exception to this approach exists in Latin
America where typically only individual income arising within the country is
taxable.)
But insofar as intercorporate dividends are concerned, there is no presumption of
a tax in the receiving country. This is implicit in the fact that the underlying corpo-
rate tax on income earned by a subsidiary and the withholding tax on the dividend
paid to the parent corporation are treated similarly and added together for purposes
of determining the credit.'
As total creditable foreign taxes come to equal or exceed the United States tax,
either directly for individual countries or by operation of the over-all limitation, the
whole process of computing the tax which would be due in the absence of the credit
and the creditable foreign taxes which offset the U.S. tax becomes a somewhat
pointless exercise. It thus seems reasonable on pragmatic grounds to give up the
whole attempt to collect revenue when it is clear that little if any will be due.
Exemption from taxation of income from direct foreign investment would simply
recognize the fact that foreign countries have exercised their admitted first claim
to tax income where it arises to such an extent that there is nothing left for us to
collect unless we wish to impose what would be, in effect, a penalty tax on foreign-
source income.
Tax exemption, however, even if the exemption is from a virtually fictional tax
which is seldom if ever payable, may be politically unacceptable. It would be
criticized as discriminating in favor of foreign as compared to domestic invest-
ment. And in the political arenas, foreign investment is often mistakenly presumed
to have adverse effects on the long-run balance of payments, to be at the expense
'E.g., INT. REV. CODE of i954, H 901-04.
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of domestic investment, and to provide jobs abroad at the expense of jobs at home.
A more acceptable change in the law might be to establish a rate on income from
foreign direct investment at two-thirds or three-quarters the rate applicable to
domestic income. This would give effective exemption in virtually all cases by a
sufficiently wide margin to obviate the temptation for the home government to attempt
to secure revenue from foreign sources by reallocating income and deductions and
for foreign governments to raise their taxes selectively to take for themselves any
increments of revenue which we would otherwise receive. As compared to outright
exemption it would also restrict abuses if foreign income is thrown into tax haven
areas where tax rates are nominal.
There is no clear pattern for future development in the taxation of income from
direct foreign investment. The effective U.S. corporate tax rate is likely to be higher
than those in Western Europe, because of the combination of a high statutory
rate and less liberal allowances for depreciation and other inducements for invest-
ment. European countries are, therefore, not likely to secure any net revenue from
investment by their companies in the United States, unless they follow the French
procedure of a low flat rate of tax with no credit for foreign taxes. Others may
choose to follow the Dutch example and give outright exemption. For European
investment in Latin America, there may be some small incremental tax due in
the countries which follow the U.S. pattern, with credits for foreign taxes. In
countries which directly limit the export of capital, neutrality in taxation between
foreign and domestic investment is not a major objective since capital export pre-
sumably is allowed only when it is deemed to be in the national interest, taking
account of both the balance of payments and the allocation of resources.
In the United States there is as yet little disposition to make a major change
in our traditional taxation of income from direct foreign investment, though events
abroad have made it, as noted, a futile gesture. There is increasing recognition of
this fact and of the further fact that in those instances where we do collect an incre-
mental income tax on repatriated profits from foreign subsidiaries, the total income
tax burden on them is higher than that on their competitors. The total burden of
all taxes is also likely to be higher on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies than on
domestic business here because of the greater use of value-added and other indirect
taxes abroad. But neutrality in the income tax treatment of foreign and domestic in-
vestment remains an effective political slogan here, and exemption, though reason-
able, is not likely. In fact, suggestions are recurringly made that the United States
adopt the French approach, thereby collecting some tax from all foreign investment
even though this would violate our traditional objective of neutrality.
There is no consensus as to what, if any, change would be desirable. In view of the
development of excess foreign tax credits, the general policy of the U.S. tax treat-
ment cannot be said to be a significant constraint on foreign direct investment.
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Under our tax law, however, we have a tight rule against the use of foreign
tax havens which puts U.S. business at a competitive disadvantage because many
other industrial countries are quite generous in this regard. U.S. parent corporations
are taxed on the undistributed income of their foreign subsidiaries which are deemed
to be base or tax haven companies under objective criteria. Prior to 1962, various
devices were developed by which purely domestic profits were "exported" to tax
havens, as when U.S. insurance companies reinsured domestic risks with wholly-
owned subsidiary insurance companies organized in foreign countries which im-
posed little or no income tax. Some revision of the law was necessary, though many
felt that the abuses could have been curtailed by administrative action. The admin-
istration recommended, however, that all undistributed income of all foreign sub-
sidiaries be imputed to U.S. parent companies and taxed currently, a procedure
never seriously considered in any other country.
The legislation adopted in 1962, though it stopped short of the proposals of
the administration, prevented the use of tax havens even when no profits in any way
originating in the United States were involved. If products were manufactured
by a subsidiary in country A and sold by a subsidiary in country B through a
corporation in country H, a tax haven, which received and held most of the profits,
it would appear to our national advantage to let the process continue. The use
of the tax haven made more net profit ultimately available to the U.S. parent corpo-
ration and led to less foreign tax to apply as a credit against U.S. taxes. But under
the 1962 legislation, undistributed income of the subsidiary in H isimputed to and
taxed currently to the U.S. parent corporation. The net result is not more U.S. revenue
but rather the abandonment of the subsidiary in H, with more revenue to foreign
countries A and B. Net profits are thus reduced, with adverse effects on any revenue
which we would otherwise collect. This attempt to extend our tax jurisdiction abroad
seems altogether contrary to our national interest. Other countries appear to permit
the use of tax havens to increase the competitive effectiveness of their companies inter-
nationally. This part of the U.S. tax law represents a futile reaching for revenues
with adverse effects on our balance of payments and, in the last analysis, an adverse
effect on revenue.
Differences in policies regarding the allocation of international income have
already been noted. This is typically an administrative matter and has seldom
received attention in general analyses of the tax treatment of international income.
It is becoming increasingly important, however, and will be significant regardless of
taxability or exemption of foreign income. With exemption, in fact, the burden
on the definition of income would become even greater.
Every country has to have some control of the allocation of income between
domestic and foreign sources. In the absence of control, all profits on any transaction
in any way connected with foreign activity could be allocated to the foreign juris-
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dictions if the taxes there were lower. But the right of the tax administrator to
reallocate income gives a great temptation to increase revenues by imputing most of
the income to the domestic aspect of an international activity, or even to create
income for the domestic component though none exists on the completed transaction.
And an overly eager or grasping country may impute to itself a larger fraction of
international income than will be recognized by the other countries involved, with
a net result that the sum of the segments of income exceed the total income, perhaps
by a large margin. Regulations adopted in 1968 in the United States under section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code are likely to produce this result.7
Under the new regulations, some part of research expenses or the general
expenses of the corporate headquarters are likely to be disallowed as deductions
against domestic income on the grounds that they are attributable to the activities of
foreign subsidiaries. Such a disallowance would not be of great significance if made
in good time and if the countries in which the subsidiaries operated would recognize
the costs disallowed as expenses here as proper charges to the subsidiaries. But with
equally good reasons, the foreign tax administrations might not allow the allocation
made here on the grounds that the expenses were primarily for the domestic activities
of the U.S. parent company and would have been incurred for it alone. With an
impasse of this sort, total taxes may be much larger than those indicated by the
statutory tax rate in either country. A company considering activities abroad may
run the risk that new foreign profits may be more than wiped out by higher U.S.
taxes arising from disallowance of deductions in computing U.S. taxable income,
which would otherwise have been unquestioned.
Similar problems arise in determining allowable transfer prices for products
between related companies in two or more countries. Exports to subsidiaries may be
made at something above marginal costs to yield modest profits in competitive
markets abroad. But for tax purposes they may be deemed to be transferred at
higher prices based on average or "full" costs, thereby increasing U.S. revenue. But
at this presumptive transfer price there would be no profit or even a loss in the
foreign country, a result which would be manifestly absurd and unaceptable to the
foreign tax administration.
Until recently, most tax administrations handled allocation problems on a fairly
pragmatic basis. Gross abuses were penalized, but an ability to compete effectively
abroad was recognized as more important than maximum revenue or a theoretically
perfect determination of income. The new U.S. regulations have great appeal in
theory but fail to recognize the valid interests of other countries and the limitations
of tax administrations both here and abroad. The regulations, in fact, invite
disallowances of expenses here and will lead to continuing controversy and in many
instances to significant tax penalties on international activities of U.S. companies.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (x968).
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No major foreign government has a comparable degree of refinement in its
procedures for the allocation of income. Over the years, multilateral agreement
may and certainly should be reached. In the meantime, however, by unilateral
action, the United States has placed its companies at a significant disadvantage.
Important though revenue is, it seems unwise to try to increase it at the expense
of our even more important balance of payments.
